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ACTIVATION MEASURES IN SOCIAL
LESSONS FROM THE DUTCH CASE

SECURITY:

Frans Pennings*
Dutch social security has undergone important changes since
the 1990s, in that the focus shifted from predominantly
compensating the loss of income into giving incentives for
claimants and benefits recipients to stay in or get back to work.
While still providing a relatively high level of benefit if there is no
chance to work (to the full extent), the legislature has been quite
creative in adopting conditions that stimulate persons to do their
best to be in work. For this purpose, this is interesting for an
American audience, since the USA system is far less generous out
of fear that persons will not do enough to take care of themselves,
while also leaving those who cannot earn a sufficient income
alone. A combination of activating conditions and a good safety
net is, therefore, an interesting alternative.

* Professor of Labour Law and Social Security Law, Utrecht University,
Netherlands.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s, Dutch policy makers became conscious
that employers were using the Social Security Acts in ways the
legislature did not intend.1 One improper use by employers of the
Social Security Acts during this time involved employers sending
adverse employees home for being sick; this was the cost effective
solution because the sickness benefit fund would reimburse the
wage costs lost by the employer.2 Because of this, adverse
employees would feel “sick” when they were actually stressed so
they could be sent home instead of providing the employee with
other ways to relieve their stress. However, employers had no
financial incentives to assist their employees and solve the
conflict because the Sickness Benefit Act covered the employees’
wages.3 Therefore, the employee remained in the picture under
the presumption that the employee was sick. Eventually, such
employees could be considered disabled. This was referred to as
“activation,” meaning that individuals should be activated in
order to make as little use of the benefit that was possible by
motivating individuals to take responsibility for themselves.4
Another improper use by employers of the Social Security
Acts had to do with over providing disability benefits to employees
than was intended by the legislature.5 During the 1970s and
1980s, the mass redundancies in Dutch workplaces was a problem
so, in an attempt to resolve this issue, a considerable number of
employees who would have been terminated were instead
provided disability benefits.6 Of course, such workers had to be
disabled to some extent, but in practice they received full benefits
even in cases where the employee only had a minor degree of
disability.7 Access to benefits was very easy because often the
1. See generally Belang en beleid: Naar een verantwoorde uitvoering van de
werknemersverzekeringen, (Sdu Uitgeverij Plantijnstraat, Den Haag, 1994)
(explaining the distribution of responsibilities of benefit administration).
2. Sabine Geurts et al., Curing the Dutch Disease? Sickness Absence and Work
Disability in the Netherlands, 53 INT’L SOC. SEC. REV. 79, 80 (2000).
3. Frans Pennings & Paul M. Secunda, Towards the Development of Governance
Principles for the Administration of Social Protection Benefits: Comparative Lessons
from Dutch and American Experiences, 16 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV.
313, 348 (2015).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Duncan McVicar et al., Four Decade of Disability Benefit Policies and the Rise
and Fall of Disability Recipiency Rates in Five OECD Countries (September 2, 2016),
https://www.human.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/PAM/people/nrz2/The-rise-and-fall-
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assessing doctors of the benefit administration made the decision
based off of the employee’s file.
These improper uses of the system by employers illustrate
how the benefit system was carrying the costs of these employers
decisions in some aspects. Of course, the government tried to
change the rules, lower benefits, put fines on abuse; however,
employers continued to request claims from the benefit system.8
Thus, this problem needed to be approached differently. First, it
would be better to re-arrange the responsibilities in the total
system9 and, second, employees should be incentivized to reduce
the risk of becoming sick or disabled.10 Before the benefit
administration, employer and employee associations did not have
the proper incentives to reduce claims by employees and
employers to the benefit system, so such associations were
removed from the benefit administration.11
There was a period of time when some believed that private
insurance companies should administer some acts like disability
and sickness, however, the government continued to supervise the
benefits system under the control of the Minister of Social
Affairs.12 An essential element of the benefit system is to assess
employees’ incapacity for work, which is a significant factor in
keeping the system public to maintain public responsibility.13
One reason the benefits system cannot be privatized is because
private companies wish to reduce benefit costs, thus, they have a
conflict of interest.14
Therefore, the Uitvoeringsinstituut
werknemersverzekeringen (UWV), the benefit administration
of-disability-recipiency-rates-in-five-OECD-countries_v11-clean.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F8T9-F5WY].
8. SICKNESS AND DISABILITY SCHEMES IN THE NETHERLANDS 5 (Nov. 2007)
http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/41429917.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR64-WHHY].
9. See
VERANTWOORDELIJKHEIDSVERDELING
SOCIALE
ZEKERHEID:
TERREINVERKENNENDE STUDIE OVER DE VERDELING VAN VERANTWOORDELIJKHEDEN
OP HET TERREIN VAN DE SOCIALE ZEKERHEID (Sociaal-Economische Raad, Jan. 1994).
The Social Economic Council is a tripartite (i.e. consisting of representatives of
employers and employees organizations and independent experts appointed by the
minister of social affairs) with the task (inter alia) to advise the government on
socioeconomic issues.
10. See generally Belang en beleid, supra note 1.
11. See Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen 29 november
2001, Stb. 2001, 624 (Neth.).
12. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 349.
13. See generally P.S. Fluit, Verzekeringen van solidariteit, (Deventer: Kluwer,
2001); see also FRANS PENNINGS, DUTCH SOCIAL
SECURITY LAW IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT (Kluwer L. Int’l, 2002) (providing a
general overview of the system).
14. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 349.
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employees’ scheme, was established.15 The UWV is a national
organization that administers the disability, sickness, and
unemployment benefit packages, as well as other benefits.16
Thus, the conditions for benefits are still governed by the law
and the rights of the beneficiaries are not changed in comparison
to the previous situation. Instead, the way the responsibilities are
organized varies according to the type of benefit.
II. PROTECTION IN CASE OF SICKNESS
The new approach materialized when a statutory obligation
for employers to pay wages during an employee’s illness was
introduced. In 1994, a new rule was introduced that employers
had to pay sick employees for the first six weeks of their illness.17
Small employers, which are defined to have less than fifteen
employees, had to pay sick employees for the first two weeks of
their illness.18 The new act was passed to incentivize employers
to follow up with employees and determine whether ill employees
were rightfully absent because employers would be responsible for
income provisions.19 Additionally, employers were expected to
reduce risks of injury and sickness caused by dangerous
conditions in the workplace.20 Particularly, the construction
industry had to take further measures to reduce the number of
risks in the workplace.21 Although there were already acts that
required preventive measures, the new provisions motivated
employers to take further action to prevent injuries, accidents,
and illnesses.
Despite the uncertainty of whether the sickness act had the
desired effect, two years later the employers’ responsibility to pay
wages was nevertheless extended from six weeks to fifty-two
weeks.22 The extension was created through an amendment of

15. See Historie, structuur, huisvesting, medewerkers en Cao UWV,
https://www.uwv.nl/overuwv/wat-is-uwv/organisatie/detail/historie-structuurhusvesting-medewerkers [https://perma.cc/85VN-L38Z] (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
16. Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen, supra note 11.
17. Pennings, supra note 13, at 12.
18. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 360.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 360-61. For instance, measures that could be taken to enforce the rules
more strongly include: wearing a helmet, enforced shoes, and protection barriers when
employees were working on high-level sites. Additionally, a policy to avoid sickness
due to stress or conflicts at work could contribute to lower costs.
22. Wet uitbreiding loondoorbetalingsplicht bij ziekte 8 februari 1996, Stb. 1996,
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the Civil Code in order to provide sick employees 70% of wages for
up to fifty-two weeks.23 In collective agreements, the parties often
provided that this statutory minimum was to be supplemented to
make up for the full wage.24 How this was done varied from
agreement to agreement.
The privatization of the Sickness Benefits Act has to do with
substituting the right to sickness benefit with the employer’s
obligation to pay employees sick pay.25 However, this does not
really privatize benefits because the act defines what the
employers’ obligations are and the rights of employees.26 The
Civil Code has strict rules, however, the employer is entirely
responsible for the costs and may supplement these laws with
additional rules in order to realize his responsibilities.27 The
employers must comply with the statutory obligations and are
subject to rulings in court.
Employers are able to, but not required, purchase private
insurance to cover risks. In order to allow a smooth introduction
of the act and to gain a new, vast market, the joint insurance
companies decided that when employers bought insurance they
would not assess the health conditions of the employees, as this
insurance covers all employees, so the employer does not choose
specific employees the employer wants insured.28 When the risk
was only six weeks, employers often bore the risks themselves,
but upon the introduction of the fifty-two-week period, they
bought insurance on a higher scale.29 In the insurance rules,
employers often still bear risks, such as during the first six weeks
of employee sick leave, or when the employee is absent for longer
than is covered in the benefits scheme, (stop loss insurance).30
The Sickness Benefits Act is still in effect and applies to

134.

23. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 361.
24. See W.J.P.M. FASE ET AL., SOCIALE ZEKERHEID: PRIVAAT

OF PUBLIEK?
(Deventer: Kluwer, 1994).
25. ULRICH BECKER, FRANS PENNINGS, & TINEKE DIJKHOFF, INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD-SETTING AND INNOVATIONS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 445 (Alan C. Neal et al.
eds.,Wolters Kluwer, 2013)..
26. Id. at 381.
27. Art. 7:629 BW (Neth.).
28. ADVIES INZAKE KABINETSVOORNEMENS ZW, AAW EN WAO (SociaalEconomische Raad, Apr. 1995).
29. T.J. VEERMAN & J.J.M. BESSELING, PRIKKELS EN PRIVATISERING:
INTEGRERENDE RAPPORTAGE EVALUATIE WETGEVING ROND ZIEKTEVERZUIM, WAO EN
REÏNTEGRATIE 27 (2001).
30. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 362.
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persons who do not have an employer.31 An example of the first
group are flexible workers, the other group is the unemployed.32
This Act provides a safety net for unemployed and flexible
workers.
The 1997 Act on Medical Examinations allows
employers to employ individuals who have a higher risk of
becoming ill because the act restricted medical examinations in
recruitment procedures.33 Unless the particular job requires
specific health requirements, it prohibits medical examinations as
a standard practice.34 This Act’s purpose was to diminish the
chance that chronically ill individuals will never get work.
Not only did the benefit rules change, an amendment to the
Law on Conditions at the Workplace forced employers to improve
working conditions.35 One would presume that accidents at work
would be reduced with better working conditions. Furthermore,
employers have to develop a solution to lower sickness at work.36
Because of this, employers must determine all potential
situations that endanger the health and safety of the employees.37
The government did not find that employers obligation to
continue to pay sick employees their wages was a sufficient
reintegration effort.38 This was because private insurance
reimbursed the employer’s obligation to pay wages.39
Furthermore, employers’ version of reintegration measures would
be expensive or bothersome than actually paying the wages of a
sick employee.40 For these reasons, the Gatekeepers Act came
into effect.41
The purpose of the Gatekeepers Act’s was to limit employers’
31. Art. 18:1 WTZ (Neth.).
32. Unemployed persons are also covered for sickness, even though that may not
lead to a different income, since they may be disqualified for unemployment benefit
during sickness. In addition, in case of long-term sickness, when they are not be able
to work again full-time, these persons may qualify for disability benefits. These
benefits are financed by contributions paid to the sickness and disability funds.
33. Art. 3-5:1 WMK (Neth.).
34. See E.L. de Vos et al., Evaluatie: Wet op de medische keuringen, DEN HAAG:
ZON MW, June 2001.
35. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 362-63.
36. Verdrag betreffende arbeidsveiligheid, gezondheid, en het arbeidsmilieu;
Genève, 3 juni 1981 Trb. 1981, 4:1 (Neth.).
37. Verdrag betreffende arbeidsveiligheid, gezondheid, en het arbeidsmilieu;
Genève, 3 juni 1981 Trb. 1981, 5 (Neth.).
38. Parliamentary Papers II 2000-2001, 27.678, nr. 3, (Explanatory
Memorandum to Wet Verbetering poortwatcher).
39. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 363.
40. Id.
41. Wet Verbetering Poortwachter 29 november 2001, Stb. 2001, 628 (Neth.).
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ability to access to the Disability Benefits Act.42 The Gatekeepers
Act requires both employers and sick employees to take on
reintegration efforts if an employee’s illness is projected to last for
a long period of time.43 When an employee expects to be sick for
more than six weeks, the employer and the employee are obligated
to make a plan for reintegration back into the workplace.44 For
example, such a plan might involve adjusting an employee’s
impairments in the workplace or by offering additional training
or other jobs in the workplace. Moreover, the employer and
employee must regularly meet to determine if such reintegration
methods are successful and if such reintegration plans have to be
adjusted.45 Both the employee and the employer can force the
other party to cooperate;46 if it becomes necessary, they can legally
enforce cooperation.47
The benefits administration, the UWV, may determine
whether an employer’s reintegration efforts are satisfactory three
months before the employee may apply for disability benefits.48
To show that the activities have been sufficient, the employee
must provide a report on what reintegration activities occurred.49
When an employer’s actions are found to be unsatisfactory by the
benefit administration, the employer is obligated to pay the
employee’s wages for a maximum of twelve months.50 Altogether,
the employer may have to pay wages for a total of three years.51
However, when the employee has not cooperated satisfactorily,
such employee may be refused disability benefits for a certain
period regulated by the Disability Benefits Act.52
A disadvantage of organizing social protection at a lower level
is that it is difficult to have thorough research due to low reporting
rates on actual payment to sick employees by their employers.
Strict labor law and dismissal law narrow the ability to get out of
the employers obligations.53 In the previously mentioned Act on
Medical Examinations during recruitment, this Act was suppose
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See generally Art. 7:629 WGA (Neth.).
Art. 658a para. 5 BW (Neth.).
Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 363.
Id.
Art. 4.1:30 para. 2 BW (Neth.); Art. 658a para. 2 BW (Neth.).
Art. 7:658b BW (Neth.).
See Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 364.
Id.
Art. 7:629(11) BW (Neth.).
See Art. 7:629 BW (Neth.).
Art. 4.1:30 para. 1 WGA (Neth.).
Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 364.
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to lower risk selection. Another example of a law that reduces
risks to employers is the dismissal law (laid down in the Civil
Code) that contains the rule that an employee cannot be
terminated within the first two years of sickness.54 Employers
still can lower their risks by selecting employees carefully and
terminating employees who fall ill during the period that they
have reported recovery.55 How often this actually happens in the
workplace is too difficult to research. If an employer’s behavior
becomes discriminatory, the law prohibits employers from
discriminating against disabled persons.56 However, in practice,
it is difficult to prove that in a particular situation the
discriminatory nature of an employer’s behavior was grounded on
disability.57 Furthermore, employers often would offer employees
contracts for a specified period of time rather than an indefinite
period so that the employer would not risk the possibility of
paying sick employees’ wages.58 Employers could also use
temporary work agencies.59
After the Gatekeepers Act was enacted, larger employers
formed in house plans using ill employees in other work capacities
within the workplace.60 The benefit administration obligates
many employers to pay sick employees for an extended period of
after the first two years because the benefit administration does
not find this to be enough of reintegration for sick employees.61
In any case, as we can conclude, this new system strictly
encourages employers and their ill employees to make
reintegration plans for the ill employees back into the workplace
as there are severe consequences when they are negligent.62
Reintegration is most successful while an employee is still
employed, this happens during the first two years of sickness
because employers are prohibited from terminating such sick
employees;63 this is a cornerstone of present day Dutch social

54. Art. 7:670 para. 1 BW (Neth.).
55. Art. 7:670b para. 3 BW (Neth.).
56. See Wet gehijke behandeling op grond van handicap of chronische ziekte 3
april 2003, Stb. 2003, 206 (Neth.).
57. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 364-65.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 365.
60. See F.A. Reijenga et al., Onderzoek evaluatie wet verbetering poortwatcher,
(Astri, 2006).
61. Id. at 15.
62. Id. at 45-46.
63. Art. 7:629 para. 1 BW (Neth.).
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security policy because activation is very important.64
In all, as we have seen above, the employers have been made
fully responsible for sick pay, for up to a period of two years.65 The
minimum rules are provided in the Civil Code, from which no
exception is possible.66
III. THE NEW DISABILITY BENEFITS ACT OF 2004
Since the Disability Benefit Act (WAO) continued to have
problems with high numbers of new entrants and only few
beneficiaries leaving the benefit scheme,67 a new structural
approach was followed in the new Disability Benefits Act of
2004.68 In this approach, the priority of work above benefit was
stressed so the WAO introduced new benefit opportunities.69
The WAO makes a distinction between groups of claimants:
(A) who are permanently disabled to at least 80%; and (B) who are
either not permanently disabled, or who are permanently
disabled to a lesser extent than 80%.70 The former group (Group
A) deserves, in the view of the legislature, a generous disability
benefit because measures to help them to get back to work are
more difficult and pursued less than reintegration efforts in
Group B.71 In this case, permanently disabled employees (Group
A) receive 75% of their former wage as a benefit.72 Those who are
permanently disabled by at least 80% incapacity are entitled to
the benefit for the permanently disabled.73
The second group (Group B) is subject to conditions and rules
meant to reinforce their activation back into work.74 In order for
members of Group B to be eligible for disability benefits,
employees must be disabled exceeding a 35% rate of incapacity.75
Members of Group B receive a wage-related benefit if they can

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See BECKER ET AL., supra note 25, at 443-56.
Art. 7:629 para. 1 BW (Neth.).
Art. 7:629 para. 9 BW (Neth.).
B. Cuelenaere et al., Onderzoek evaluatie wia, 46-48 (2011).
Id.
See BAREND BARENTSEN, ARBEIDSONGESCHIKTHEIRD: AANSPRAKELIJKHEID,
BESCHMERING EN COMPENSATIE (2003).
70. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 354.
71. Id.at 355.
72. Art. 6.2:51 WIA (Neth).
73. Besliut Van 8 Juli 2000, Stb 2000 (Neht.).
74. Art. 29 BW (Neth.),
75. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 355.
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satisfy conditions relating to their employment history.76 The
benefit’s duration is directly reflected in the group member’s
employment history.77 The rules for entitlement and duration are
outlined in the Unemployment Benefits Act, which is discussed
below.78
Group B claimants are entitled to up to 70% of their previous
wages.79 When the right to this benefit has expired, or when the
claimant is not entitled to this benefit due to an insufficient work
history, a wage supplement benefit is payable, only if the claimant
earns an income of at least half their residual earning capacity.80
This is a provision, until this amendment, was not been found in
disability schemes.81 Thus, if a person has an earning capacity of
1,000 euro per month, they must earn at least 500 euro per month
in order to remain eligible for the wage supplement. This rule
was designed to incentivize remaining in the work force or
returning to the workforce after being absent due to illness or
disability.82
Wages are supplemented within 70% of the difference
between an employee’s previous earnings and their earning
capacity.83 For example, if a person earned 2,000 euro a month
and is now only able to earn 1,000 euro, the wage supplement is
700 euro. This amount is payable, regardless of how much she
earns, up to 1,000 euro, the residual earnings capacity,84
incentivizing employees to take up as much work as they can. In
other words, it is attractive to work as much as possible, since
income is not deducted from the benefit received.
Alternatively, claimants who, upon the expiration of his or
her wage-related benefit, do not earn at least 50% of his or her
remaining earning capacity after disability, are eligible for a
lower benefit, which, in the case of full disability, is 70% of the
statutory minimum wage.85 In cases of partial disability, the
benefit allocation depends on the employee’s incapacity rate.86
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Art. 59 WIA (Neth.).
Art. 61 BW (Neth.).
Art. 2:1 BW (Neth).
Art. 1.6:15 BW (Neth.).
Art. 7.2:59 BW (Neth.).
Id.
Parliamentary Papers II 2004-2005, 30.034, nr. 8, (Brief to Minister van
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid).
83. Art. 59-101 WIA (Neth.)
84. Art. 56 WIA (Neth.).
85. Art. 59 WIA (Neth.).
86. Art. 62 WIA (Neth.).
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Persons who are incapacitated by a physical disability to a level
of less than 35% are not eligible for benefit.87 It was the view of
the legislature that their incapacity rate is so low that they should
be able to find work suitable for their level of ability.88
Thus, there is now a consistent approach, elaborated in
specific and unique new rules for each scheme, aimed at reducing
the number of sickness and disability claims.89 Under this
approach, when an employee is sick or disabled, employers and
employees must do everything possible to assist the employee in
returning to work or remaining at work. The hope is that most
employees could work in a modified capacity until they return to
full health if necessary.90 If after two years, the employee is not
able to earn at least 65% of what her income was before she
became sick, the disability benefit scheme encourages her to keep
working in her current capacity or seek work that could allow her
to collect a greater portion of the benefit scheme.91 From
evaluations of this program, it appears that the number of new
entrants for benefits has been much lower than under the old
Disability Act, although whether those who are disqualified
actually find work is not so clear.92 The Act is still rather young,
so there are not clear research results yet available.93
Employers may choose to opt out of the disability scheme, but
are not obligated to do so.94 If an employer chooses to opt out of
the disability scheme, it is limited to exemption from paying
contributions to the scheme; for this reason, the term ‘own risk
bearer’ is used to describe employers.95 Instead of paying major
contributions, in this scheme, the employer bears the financial
risks of the disability benefits for the partially disabled for the
first ten years of disability.96 The Public Benefit Administration
still holds the power to grant or terminate and employee’s right to

87. Art. 61-62 WIA (Neth.).
88. Parliamentary Papers

II, 2004-2005, 30.034, nr. 3, (Explanatory
Memorandum to Wet werk en inkomen naar arbeidsvermogen).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Art. 23 para. 1 WIA (Neth.); Art. 54 WIA (Neth.); Parliamentary Papers II,
2004-2005, 30.034, nr. 3, (Explanatory Memorandum to Wet werk en inkomen naar
arbeidsvermogen).
92. See Cuelenaere et al., supra note 66.
93. WIA (Neth.) (Enacted Nov. 10, 2005).
94. Art. 85 para. 1 WIA (Neth.).
95. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 357.
96. Parliamentary Papers II, 2004-2005, 30.034, nr. 3, (Explanatory
Memorandum to Wet werk en inkomen naar arbeidsvermogen).
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a benefit, and employers and employees alike remain bound by
statutory rules regarding benefits.97 Since the employer pays the
benefit, the employer has the advantage of paying lower
contributions.98 After the first ten years of benefit payment to an
employee, the benefit administration takes over the costs of the
benefits paid to that employee.99 To supplement the costs, an
employer may purchase private insurance to cover the costs of
those first ten years of benefits.100 Usually, employers buy private
insurance when they decide to opt out of the benefits scheme, and
bear the risk on their own.101 These insurance policies are often
adjusted to the individual enterprise concerned, and little is
known to outsiders on the conditions, price and use.102 Employers
who bear their own risk are responsible for reintegration
activities of the employees for whom they bear the risk.103 Thus,
they can influence their risk and if they succeed in getting a
person back to work, they have the ‘profit’ of this work.
Remarkably, risk bearers have the statutory power to impose
a sanction, i.e., to reduce benefits in level during a certain period,
if the beneficiary does not sufficiently cooperate in the reintegration activities.104 Since the reintegration measure is an
element of public law, the employer is seen as a body of public law,
and subject to the rules of the General Act on Administrative
Law.105 This causes a rather strange effect, because these powers
fit in a system whereby the employer administers (partly) an act
of administrative law. This means that the system for motivating
decisions and the possibilities of asking for review and appeal to
the administrative court also apply (even though generally
private law (labor law) is applicable to the relationship between
employer and employee).106
In conclusion, disability benefits provide financial incentives
for beneficiaries and employees to return to work. Although,
employers are not directly involved in providing such incentives
(except when a claim is made), they can be involved if they decide
97. See Frans Penning, Kunnen Eigenrisicodragers wel hun eigen risico
beïnvloeden?, TIJDSCHRIFT RECHT EN ARDEID (May 20, 2014).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See generally Cuelenaere et al., supra note 66.
101. Id. at 69.
102. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 357.
103. Art. 27 WIA (Neth).
104. Art. 89 WIA (Neth.).
105. See generally Art. 101-19 WIA (Neth.).
106. See generally Art. 109-12 WIA (Neth).
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to bear their own risk. In such cases, a safeguard remains because
the Public Benefits Administration continues to hold decision
making power.
IV. DUTCH UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
The current Unemployment Benefits Act was adopted in
1986.107 It provides claimants, who lose at least five working
hours per week with an unemployment benefit.108 This way,
claimants do not have to be totally out of work in order to be
considered unemployed.109
In order to be collect this particular benefit, a claimant must
satisfy the following entitlement conditions: she has to be an
employee; she has to show that she has worked a certain period;
she has to be unemployed, which means that she must suffer a
relevant loss of working hours; she must no longer be entitled to
a wage for the hours in which she does not work; she must be
available for work; and there must be no grounds for exclusion.110
In order to satisfy the conditions on previous employment,
the claimant must have worked at least one hour a week for
twenty-six of the thirty-six weeks immediately preceding her first
day of unemployment.111 If the claimant was ill during this period
of reference, the period is prolonged by the length of the period of
illness.112
If one satisfies this condition, they may collect benefits for
three months.113 In order to receive an extended benefit,
additional conditions must be satisfied.114 These additional
conditions require that in each of the four calendar years out of
the five calendar years immediately preceding the beginning of a
period of unemployment, the claimant received wages over at
least 208 hours.115 If this is the case, any year in which 208 hours
are worked leads to an extra benefit month insofar as the number
is more than three, with a maximum of thirty-eight months.116

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See UWV (Neth.).
Art. 16 UWV (Neth.).
Pennings, supra note 13 at 134.
Art. 16-17 UWV (Neth.).
Art. 17 UWV (Neth.).
Id.
Art. 42 UWV (Neth.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Basically, this means one year of work is worth one benefit month.
However, the law was changed in June 2014, and the maximum
period was reduced to 24 months beginning in 2015. Since the
government wants to encourage persons more to find work and
also to reduce expenditure. 117
The Act imposes an obligation, not merely discretionary
power, on the benefit administration to sanction the beneficiary if
she does not satisfy her obligations as defined under the Law.118
Until this Law came into force in 2006, the benefit administration
had only discretionary powers to impose sanctions.119
During the first two months, the benefit, in case of full
unemployment, is 75% of the daily wage.120 After the initial, two
month period, the level drops to 70% of an employee’s daily
wage.121 An employee whose benefit falls below the applicable
subsistence income, may be eligible for a supplement under the
Supplements Act.122 When the right to benefit has ended,
employees who have become unemployed after they have reached
the age of fifty (together with their spouse if any) may, subject to
certain conditions, claim a benefit under the Income Provision for
Older and Partially Disabled Unemployed Employees.123 One of
those conditions is that the household income is below the
relevant subsistence minimum.124 Employees younger than fifty
at the time they became unemployed may claim a benefit under
the terms of the Public Assistance Act, in which case they have to
satisfy a means test on income and capital.125
The claimant of the unemployment benefit is obliged to notify
the UWV at its request or on his or her own initiative immediately
of all facts and circumstances that, in all fairness, could affect his
or her entitlement to benefit, the assertion of his or her
entitlement to benefit, the level or duration of the benefit or the
benefit amount paid to the employee.126 Violation of this broadly
formulated obligation is punishable by an administrative fine of
117. See Important Changes in Dutch Law Taking Effect as of January 1, 2015,
KERKMAN L. (2014).
118. Art. 27 UWV (Neth.).
119. See F.J.L. PENNINGS & A. C. DAMSTEEGT, DE WERKLOOSHEIDSWET (Kluwer:
Deventer 2009).
120. Art. 45 UWV (Neth.).
121. Art. 47 UWV (Neth.).
122. Art. 2 Toeslagenwet (Neth.).
123. Art. 2 WIA (Neth.).
124. Art. 5 WIA (Neth.).
125. Art. 19-21 WIA (Neth.).
126. Art. 25 WIA (Neth.).
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up to 2,269 euros.127
Unemployment benefits can be reduced or withdrawn if a
person is considered to have become culpably unemployed because
of an urgent reason and s/he can be blamed for this situation.128
Grounds for such dismissal and culpable unemployment may
include theft from the employer or violence against the employer
and fellow employees, as a few examples.129 The list is not
exhaustive, but in any case, it is clear that the behavior must be
serious.
In addition, the employee can be culpably unemployed if the
employee requests that the employment relationship be
terminated.130 At the same time, continuation would not have
resulted in such difficulties for the employee that this
continuation could not, in all fairness, have been demanded of the
employee.131 This ground makes clear that in cases where the
employee takes the initiative to end an employment relationship,
s/he is culpably unemployed and benefits will be refused
completely.132
To conclude, if the employer took the initiative to terminate
the unemployment relationship, the employee is safe, i.e. this has
no effects on the benefit rights.133 This approach was adopted in
2006 in order to allow for mobility of workers.134 Before employees
had to fight their dismissal, as it was considered that otherwise
they had caused more costs than necessary, which was a ground
for refusal or reduction of benefit.135 If an employee is culpably
unemployed, the UWV has to refuse unemployment benefits
permanently and totally.136
Not only in case of culpable unemployment does the
Werkloosheidswet provide for which measure needs to be taken;
the same applies if the claimant does not prevent becoming or
staying unemployed as a result of neglecting to accept suitable
work or for failing to obtain or to keep suitable work through his

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Art. 27 UWV (Neth).
Art. 27 UWV (Neth.); Art. 24 UWV (Neth.).
Art. 24 UWV (Neth.); Art 678 BW (Neth).
Art. 24 UWV (Neth.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Pennings & Damsteegt, supra note 119.
Art. 22 UWV (Neth.); Art. 24 UWV (Neth.).
Art. 22 UWV (Neth.).
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own fault.137 Suitable work is all work that is appropriate given
the employee’s strength and competence, unless acceptance may
not be demanded of him or her for reasons of a physical, mental
or social nature.138
If an employee neglects to accept suitable work or if he fails
to obtain suitable work through his own fault, and remains
unemployed because of his neglect, the benefit must permanently
be refused over the number of hours for which the entitlement to
benefit would have ended if the employee would have accepted or
obtained the work in question.139 The Act also obliges the
claimant to actively apply for work and not to impose
requirements on work, which make it difficult to find suitable
employment.140 Additionally, claimants are obliged to cooperate
in pursuing education or training, that may be considered
necessary for his employment or in other activities, which are
beneficial to his reintegration.141
In addition to the previously mentioned obligations, the UVW
calls for obligations of the employee, which are designed to make
the administration of unemployment benefits easier.142 These
obligations concern actions or omissions by the employee
resulting in delaying, hampering or hindering the UWV’s work.143
Some administrative obligations must be met within a specific
period of time.144
These concerns include notification of
unemployment, submission of a request for benefit, registration
as a job-seeker, and extension of that registration.145 A worksheet
is a form listing of, among other things, questions on work done,
and income received.146
The Unemployment Benefit Act seeks to promote
reintegration of persons in work or to prevent employees from
claiming higher thresholds by reducing benefit levels and
duration. This provision makes it possible for employees to
receive
unemployment
benefits
in
cases
of
partial

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Art. 24 UWV (Neth.).
Id.
Art. 27 UWV (Neth.).
Art. 24 UWV (Neth.).
Art. 26 UWV (Neth.).
See Art. 24 UWV (Neth.).
Art. 24 UWV (Neth.); Art. 30 UWV (Neth.).
Art. 26 UWV (Neth.).
Id.
Art. 6 UWV (Neth.); Art. 25 UWI (Neth.).
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unemployment.147
In 2013 the government asked for advice from the Social
Economic Council on how to involve employers and trade unions
more in administration of unemployment benefits.148 This could
be done if employers and employees are equally responsible for
the financing of the scheme.149 In that case the employers receive
the full advantage of an active policy of preventing unemployment
and helping the unemployed back to back. This is more difficult
to reach than in case of sickness, since unemployment can occur
in waves, therefore, is difficult to finance and handle.150 Still, it
is expected that the solution lies in the labor market.151
V. HEALTH CARE SCHEME
Until 2006, the health care system was a dual system,
meaning only employees were covered, so long as they earned a
low enough wage, by the compulsory Law on Health Care; others
could buy voluntary insurance.152 This dual system was criticized
because of the differences between the voluntary system and the
public system, often resulting in more generous conditions for
private insurance and a lack of compulsory insurance for
everybody else.153 This old system was replaced in 2005 by the
Care Insurance Act.154 The new Act obligates all residents of the
Netherlands to take out private health care insurance.155
This new Act was implemented because the new mechanisms
within the act were deemed necessary for the legislature to regain
control over health care expenses.156 The costs for medical care
147. Art. 17 UWV (Neth.).
148. Prospects for a Socially Responsible and Enterprising County: Emerging from
the Crisis and Getting Back to Work on the Way to 2020, STICHTING VAN DE ARBEID
(Apr. 11, 2013); SER, WERKLOOSHEID BEPERKEN, VOORKOMEN EN GOED VERZEKEREN
(Feb. 2015).
149. Prospects for a Socially Responsible and Enterprising County: Emerging from
the Crisis and Getting Back to Work on the Way to 2020, supra note 148.
150. See Prospects for a Socially Responsible and Enterprising County: Emerging
from the Crisis and Getting Back to Work on the Way to 2020, supra note 148; see also
WERKLOOSHEID BEPERKEN, VOORKOMEN EN GOED VERZEKEREN, supra note 148.
151. See id.
152. Wynand P.M.M. van de Ven & Frederik T. Schut, Universal Mandatory
Health Insurance In the Netherlands: A Model for the United States?, 27 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 771, 772 (2008).
153. Id. at 772-73.
154. See ZVW (Neth.).
155. See id.
156. Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29.763, nr. 3, (Explanatory
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had been rising for several years, due to the aging of the
population and rapid medical-technological developments, which
brought new expensive tools, machines, and treatment methods,
and the costs were expected to grow even further .157
Economic approaches have become very influential in Dutch
health care.158 The new act was designed to create a system of
controlled competition between insurance companies; in this
respect there is a large difference from the old version of the law,
which was much more centrally regulated by the State.159
The new Act was designed to ensure that insurance
companies, care providers, and the insured, are encouraged to
organize and use health care more efficiently.160 For this purpose,
the Act requires each insured person (i.e., each resident) to choose
a care insurance company from which he or she buys insurance.161
The hope is, that as a result of the competition between insurance
companies, the companies will focus more on the preferences of
the insured.162 Insurance companies will also be required to make
the ability to buy care from care providers more efficient,
otherwise, the contributions for which insurance companies will
have to pay will be too high (or the losses will become too great).163
In addition to this competition element, the Act also contains
important solidarity elements. All residents are compulsorily
insured, and insurance companies are required to provide all
applicants with insurance, regardless of their personal
characteristics and medical history, under the same conditions of
the insurance they offer.164 The Act also guarantees that an
insurance company can charge differently for basic insurance
packages (i.e., the insurance regulated by the Act).165 In the Act,
basic insurance packages are defined, outlining specifically, what

Memorandum to Van Toelichting).
157. .Id.
158. See Id
159. Id.
160. See Art. 2 ZVW (Neth.).
161. Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29.763, nr. 3, (Explanatory
Memorandum to Van Toelichting).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Art. 17 ZVW (Neth.); Art. 4 WBP (Neth.).
165. See generally Waarvoor ben ik Verzekerd via het Basispakket van de
Zorgverzekering,
Rijksoverheid,
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/
zorgverzekering/vraag-en-antwoord/wat-zit-in-get-basispaket-van-de-zorgverzekering
[https://perma.cc/QFY6-TT99] (last visited 30 Sept. 2017).
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care must be available and under certain conditions.166 Examples
of care that is available include: medical care by general
practitioners, medical specialists and midwives; stays in
hospitals; medicines; specialist medical mental health care,
including treatment by a psychiatrist; basic mental health care,
including primary care psychologist and an Internet treatment
process; tools for treatment, care, rehabilitation, nursing or a
specific limitation; physiotherapy to eighteen years; limited
physical therapy and exercise therapy from the twenty-first
treatment for certain chronic diseases; pelvic physiotherapy for
urinary incontinence until the ninth treatment; speech therapy
and occupational therapy; dental care (control and treatment) for
children up to eighteen years; dental surgical care (surgery) and
dentures; patient transport; maternity care; up to three hours of
treatment dietary advice.167 The law also covers fees associated
with up to three IVF treatments.168 Dyslexia care is also covered
through the act.169 Finally the act provides coverage, allowing for
participation in smoking cessation programs.170
Insurance companies decide how health insurance plans are
implemented.171 One of these choices that the insurance company
may decide is whether the costs are reimbursed or if care
providers are paid by the company directly.172 Another choice the
insurance company may decide is whether a risk borne by the
insured person, in addition to the statutory risk, may lead to
contribution reductions or not.173 In view of these choices,
insurance companies can compete with other insurance

166. Art. 25 ZVW (Neth.).
167. See generally Waarvoor ben ik Verzekerd via het Basispakket van de
Zorgverzekering,
Rijksoverheid,
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/
zorgverzekering/vraag-en-antwoord/wat-zit-in-get-basispaket-van-de-zorgverzekering
[https://perma.cc/6DGR-5EGW] (last visited 30 Sept. 2017).
168. Nieuw IVF-beleid Levert Besparigen en Betere Zorg, Zorginstituut Nederland
(Sept. 3 2017), https://www.zorginstituutnederland.nl/actueel/nieuws/2017/03/
09/nieuw.ivf-beleid-levert-besparingen-en-betere-zorg [https://perma.cc/J4BF-AG6D].
169. Een Verzekerde kan Onder Voorwaarden in Aanmerking Komen Voor
Hulpmiddelen om Informatie tot zich te nemen, Zorginstituut Nederland
https://www.zorginstituutnederland.nl/Verzekerde+zorg//hulpmiddelen-voorinformatievoorziening [https://perma.cc/2T69-59YD] (last visited 3 Nov. 2017).
170. Zorg Bij Stoppen met Roken nu al in Basispakket, Zorginstituut Nederland (7
Feb. 2008), https://www.zorginstituutnederland.nl/actueel/nieuws/2008/07/02/zorgbij-stoppen-met-roken-nu-al-in-basispakket [https://perma.cc/TW3E-74WY].
171. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 367.
172. Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29.763, nr. 3, (Explanatory
Memorandum to Van Toelichting).
173. Id.
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companies and can profit from their insurance schemes.174
Under the act there are no insured persons, there are
individuals who have the obligation to buy insurance from an
insurance company.175 If an individual does not buy their
insurance, that individual is not insured. When a person does not
have insurance, they can be fined for not being insured.176
A person’s insurance begins the day that the company
receives the application for insurance; it can have a retroactive
effect with a maximum of four months after the insured needed to
have insurance.177 It is unconventional for insurance companies
to have this retroactive effect, however, the justification for it is
to guarantee that there is always insurance coverage for persons
who later decide to purchase insurance coverage or for individuals
who switch insurance companies at the end of the year.178
Every year, insured individuals may terminate their
insurance contract with their insurance company.179 The reason
being to make it more accessible for individuals to switch
insurance companies.180 When someone switches insurance
companies, companies must accept all new applications no matter
what the applicant’s risk profile is.181 Thus, those who are
identified as a ‘bad risk’ may also change companies.
Aside from the statutory insurance products, health care
companies may offer supplementary insurance, which includes
provisions and services not in the basic insurance plan.182
Supplementary insurance is not mandatory, however it is more
attractive for the companies because it is usually more profitable
than the statutory insurances.183 Insurance companies are
allowed to refuse applicants for supplementary insurance.184 For
supplementary insurance, many companies require that the basic
insurance is also accepted from their company, so that selection
of the supplementary insurance may allow for the possibility of
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 368.
Art. 1 ZVW (Neth.); Art. 2 ZVW (Neth.).
Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 368.
See ZVW (Neth.).
Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29.763,
Memorandum to Van Toelichting).
179. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 368.
180. Id.
181. Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29.763,
Memorandum to Van Toelichting).
182. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 368.
183. Id. at 368-369.
184. Id. at 369.
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moving to another insurance company.185
As we have already seen, insured individuals have to pay the
contribution of the chosen insurance contract; this contribution
shall be the same for all individuals who have purchased the same
insurance plan.186 Contribution rates cannot be different whether
for risk level and for age; however, the contribution rates may
vary between companies.187 The contribution rate does not
depend on income because it is flat-rate.188 The contribution can,
however, be lower if one has opted to carry higher risk themselves
(up to 500 euro a year), which is in addition to the compulsory
statutory own risk carried by the insured (385 euro a year).189
A collective contract can be provided for certain groups by
some insurance companies.190 Collective contracts may be used
“for groups such as members of a football club, trade union, an
association of patients, or employees of a particular enterprise;
there is no limit to the type of group with which an insurance
company can make an agreement.”191 Individuals who are under
eighteen years old do not have to pay contributions; individuals
with a low income may receive compensation for paying the
contribution that is paid by the Tax Office.192
Employers must contribute, based on wages, to a risk
equalization fund.193
A risk equalization fund repays an
insurance company for higher than average risk individuals.194
The purpose of this fund was to lower the risk of insurance
companies discouraging high risk individuals from buying
insurance, like those who are chronically sick.195 This does not
motivate insurance companies to be efficient when purchasing

185. Margreet Reitsma-van Rooijen, Aanvullende zorgverzekering zonder
basisverzekering
niet
altijd
mogelijk,
NIVEL
(12
Dec.
2012),
http://www.nivel.nl/nieuws/aanvullende-zorgverzekering-zonder-basisverzekeringniet-altijd-mogelijk-3 [https://perma.cc/DPX2-BZ4V].
186. Art. 17 ZVW (Neth.).
187. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 369.
188. Id.
189. Wat is het eigen risico van mijn zorgverzekering en wanneer betaal ik dit?,
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/zorgverzekering/vraag-en-antwoord/eigenrisico-zorgverzekering [https://perma.cc/3WXL-SVXD] (last visited 21 Dec. 2017).
190. Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 369.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 368.
193. Id. at 369.
194. Id.
195. Parliamentary Papers II, 2003-2004, 29.763, nr. 3, (Explanatory
Memorandum to Van Toelichting).

PENNINGSFINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

4/10/18 3:00 PM

2017] ACTIVATION MEASURES IN SOCIAL SECURITY

23

care because they are repaid.196 Due to this reason, the
equalization will take place ex ante only or based on clients’
specific characteristics.197
The contents of the health care to be provided are still defined
by statutory rules, but the administration of the health benefits
is by private organizations.198 Therefore, this system balances
being cooperative and being profitable. The purpose of this
system is to make the system more efficient, with market
instruments, while providing affordable and adequate health care
for all residents.199
VI. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING ACTIVISM IN THE DUTCH
BENEFIT SYSTEM
In this description of the Dutch system, we have not
described all benefits (e.g., family benefits and survivor benefits
are not mentioned), but a major part. Sickness and disability
benefits have been refocused in the past decade to encourage
persons to stay or reintegrate into work.200 For sickness benefits
this has been done by giving the full responsibility to the employer
(though carefully defining the statutory framework for the powers
and obligations of the employer).201 Although employees certainly
feel the effects of this change and have clear obligations for
cooperating in re-integration themselves, the major focus is on the
employer, who no longer benefits from the solidarity of other
employers that was previously organized in the Sickness Benefits
Act.202
With disability, the focus is more on the employees. They are
encouraged, after the wage-related period, by financial
instruments to take up work.203 These persons will first have had
a period during which they and their employer had to undertake
re-integration activities.204 After this, the employee can, as long
as there is an employment relationship, require the employer to
undertake reintegration activities, and this may cause the

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 370.
Id.
See generally ZVW (Neth.).
See Pennings & Secunda, supra note 3, at 370.
See Part II.
Id.
Id.
See Part III.
Id.
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employer to feel the effects of the Disability Act.205 As a result of
this system, disabled persons with better chances on the labor
market receive a higher benefit.206 Thus, the system does not
merely respond to differences in disability, but other factors, such
as having a (cooperative) employer, having a network, being
‘employable’, being motivated and sufficiently qualified, play an
important role.207
Unemployment benefits have also undergone an important
change in terms of prevention. Since 2006, after a decision of the
employer to dismiss an employee, the latter is admitted to the
benefit system if the others conditions are fulfilled. Here, the
benefit system is used to serve as “oil for the labour market,”208
workers should be encouraged to go where they are needed, and
may make use of the benefit in the intermediary period.209
Currently, the Government asked the Social-Economic Council to
investigate whether incentives, like for sick pay, can be
introduced as well for employers to keep their employees fit for
work (‘employable’) during their employment relationship, so that
they can more easily find a job when they are dismissed.210 In
case of unemployment, it is more difficult to impose measures on
employers dismissing employees, since these include also
enterprises with economic problems.
With respect to the Health Care Insurance Act, one must first
acknowledge that solidarity has increased, since, until this Act,
only employees up to a certain wage were compulsorily insured.
The present system covers all residents.211 Since the companies
compete with each other, it is not a solidarity system as such.212
However, the government keeps a strict control on maximum
contributions and rises in contributions.213 By having lower
contributions for those who accept their own high risks, making
special insurance products for those with academic degrees, and
through means of special supplementary insurances, companies
try to select more attractive clients.214

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Part IV.
Id.
Id.
See Part V.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The prohibition of risk selection (even in the case of a new
choice for a company) and the obligation to ask for the same
contributions of all buyers of the same insurance product are also
important elements of solidarity. Furthermore, the obligation of
the employer to pay a wage-related contribution and the risk
equalization fund achieves solidarity, this time between the
companies, as they share responsibility for the heavy risks.215
Here we see a tension, however, since the question is whether it
hinders effective working of the insurance market, as such a fund
does not fit well with profit-making companies.
Thus the approach does not lie in continuously changing the
rules, or applying the rules more strictly or less strictly in order
to be more efficient and to save money, because the actors in
society will try to shift their costs to the collective funds if there
is such a responsibility. This must not be seen an immoral
behaviour, but as a rational approach, at least at an individual
level, so also a rational response is required.
Such rational response can lie at putting the responsibilities
at the lowest level, with those who are directly concerned. Thus,
they will organize an adequate approach. This can be different
from benefit to benefit: i.e. the approach in case of sickness differs
from unemployment, disability and health care.
It is important that the employees are not negatively affected
and that thus, for instance in the case of sickness, the way of
assessing sickness, the level and duration of sick pay, the grounds
for exclusion and sanction and the exceptions to the obligation to
pay sick pay are strictly defined. In addition, labor law should not
allow escape routes (such as dismissal), and there has to be a
quick and accessible court system. If this exists, the system does
not deprive employees from their rights, but it encourages
employers to do much more to prevent sickness and help people
back to work. In this respect, the outcome is overall positive: it
does not rely on public finances and people find work that they
can still do. There may still be problems in some areas, especially
in case of persons who are often ill which may be dismissed in
periods of recovery. There is also a tendency that employers evade
permanent employment contracts and prefer short-term contacts
of temporary agency workers instead.216 The government has now
215. Id.
216. A.R. HOUWELING, M.J.M.T. KEULAERDS, & P. KRUIT, VAAN – VVA
EVALUATIEONDERZOEK
WWZ
2016,
(Den
Haag,
2016),
http://njb.nl/
Uploads/2016/7/vaan-vva-evaluatieonderzoek-wwz-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4YAFCWA].
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introduced a system where employers have to pay a higher
contribution for sick pay if their former employees become sick or
disabled.217 In this way it is hoped that the share of flexible work
is reduced.
The last example shows that the system will never be perfect.
It is also quite uncertain whether it can be exported to other
countries, as systems vary immensely and also the system of
labour law is decisive for the success, which system may be
different from country to country. The last issue is that detailed
data on the income effects, on people back to work, on the quality
of work etc. etc. are missing. Still, I hope that the development in
the Netherlands is useful for discussion on how a system can be
shaped in terms of distributing responsibilities and thus
influencing costs while basically leaving the rights of the
claimants intact.

217. Ziek uit dienst en de Wet bezava, UWV, https://www.uwv.nl/
overuwv/pers/nieuwsberichten/2017/ziek-uit-dienst-en-de-wet-bezava.aspx
[https://perma.cc/J7GP-RSR7] (last visited 27 Oct. 2017).

